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During the last several years Robert Amzallag as 
Senior Fellow at CIRANO has taken an active 
interest in the research and transfer activities 
undertaken by the Finance Group. He has 
suggested initiatives that would be relevant to the 
financial industry in Montreal, particularly in 
derivative products and concerning practical 
issues in governance at the director’s level. As the 
former President and CEO at BNP Paribas 
(Canada), Mr. Amzallag is certainly well placed to 
offer insightful commentary on the financial 
crisis that has preoccupied us over the last several 
months. 
 
Mr. Amzallag’s presentation combines a 
retrospective analysis of root causes of the crisis 
followed by some thoughts on what’s to come. 
As to causes, he isolates three trends that have 
been gathering force over several decades. These 
include the erosion of certain stabilizing factors, 
particularly in the credit market, that has lead to 
extreme concentrations of risk. Looking to the 
future, Mr. Amzallag cautiously explores the 
consequences of several scenarios or responses to 
the crisis. The first two represent the pursuit of 
policies reflecting established political sensibilities 
involving different degrees of government 
intervention. The third represents a more 
thoughtful re-appraisal of the different functions 
that the key players—governments, central banks, 
regulators and financial institutions —should 
pursue and should be left to pursue. 
 
We have also invited CIRANO Fellow Michel 
Magnan, Professor of Accounting at Concordia’s 
John Molson School of Business to present an 
overview of the controversy surrounding marking 
to market, an issue highlighted by Mr. Amzallag as 
an important aspect of the crisis. Professor 
Michel Magnan takes up the technical but crucial 
issue of whether fair-value accounting [FVA] was 
an inadvertent messenger of the financial crisis or 
was an actual contributor to the crisis. The point 
is far from academic. 
 
By way of appendices to these presentations, the 
Finance Group has prepared a graphic tool that 
permits the time-series presentation of key 
financial indicators against the historical 
background of the crisis. As well, we have 
prepared a primer on structured products, 
including synthetic CDOs, that have played a lead 
role in the current crisis. This presentation leads 
naturally to the software module developed at 
CIRANO that explores the risk management 













What Caused the 2007- 2008-2009 Financial crisis? 
 
he current financial crisis has reached frightening proportions. The 
fear is a consequence, not only of the vast sums of money involved 
nor of news of the number of large and reputable institutions that appear 
to be ailing, but also the result of the lack of understanding of its real 
causes.  
 
Central bankers, finance ministers and treasury secretaries of the most 
important nations are at a loss to explain what happened and how we got 
to the current debacle. This is clearly not reassuring.  
 
In the end politicians – and of course an army of lawyers – will demand 
that the ‘bad guys’ who created this mess be found and brought to justice. 
They will no doubt accuse greedy bankers and their reckless traders, the 
current US administration or Congress, hedge funds, etc....  Legislation 
and court cases will follow to appease the public.  The magnitude of the 
problem, however, and the far- reaching effects of any remedial action 
require more than ever a sober analysis of the causes of the current crisis, 
if future economic prosperity is to be preserved.  
Like many major crisis, the 2008 financial meltdown is the consequence of 
several trends that have developed over several decades and then 
converged to create a powerful and unexpected storm. 
 
The following observations were prepared in December 2008. There is always the 
worry that any remarks regarding ongoing events may be proved incorrect or 
seem irrelevant before the computer file is even saved. None the less, this 
particular risk should be taken: we will need to craft some policies to avoid any 
repetition of the current situation, and we certainly need to have some sense of 
what caused the crisis before sensible remedies are advanced.  Accordingly, my 
text is organized in two parts, one retrospective while the second looks ahead. 




In this current crisis, three main trends can be identified 
First Trend: The Rise of Risk Measurement through Statistical 
Methods 
In the late 1970s the notion of Value at Risk (VaR, in what follows) was 
created as a measure of market risks. As the number of financial 
instruments expanded and networks grew, global banks – Bankers Trust 
was the first one to address the problem – realised that giving each dealer a 
separate trading limit for each pair of currencies or traded instrument in 
each of their branches around the world would quickly overwhelm their 
capacity to consolidate and measure the aggregate risk engendered by such 
decentralization. The banks needed a new methodology in order to achieve 
a global view of their risks. 
 
The VaR, a measure of the maximum loss to be expected within a certain 
probability from any given trading position, finally emerged as a powerful 
consolidating concept.  Maximum probable future loss- in a statistical 
sense- could now be measured for each trader, dealing room, market 
activity and even for the whole institution.  Moreover, such consolidation 
had the beneficial effect of reducing the capital required to cover the risk 
of open positions. 
 
Then, when the time came to consolidate the total VaRs within an 
institution, it was quickly realised that some markets were largely 
correlated and some almost not. A more accurate assessment of the 
consolidated VaR needed to take this into account. As an extreme 
example, if a bank is long for the same amount in two different 
instruments that always move in opposite directions, clearly the total VaR 
is not the sum of each VaR but can be netted out to zero. Financial 
institutions convinced their regulators to take this mitigating factor into 
account further reducing the capital allocated to these activities. 
 
However, a major difficulty quickly surfaced: future risk is a consequence 
of future price fluctuations which cannot reliably be predicted.  A solution 
to this problem had to be found in order to salvage this powerful concept. 
At this point, professionals, academics and regulators took an unfortunate 
and dangerous leap of faith: they agreed that certain future events – such 
as price fluctuations, volatility, correlation between markets, and even  
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liquidity could be characterized using past behaviour and that by 
considering past series, we will know - within a chosen probability – the 
range of market movements. 
 
Under normal conditions, the system worked so well that it was adopted 
by regulators, rating agencies and, as we shall see later, extended to 
measuring the credit risks in a bank’s loan portfolio. 
 
Indeed, these models kept operators away from dangerous and illiquid 
markets, which had in the past, experienced highly volatile behaviour.   
Most VaR models picked up these anomalies and steered institutions away 
from them by estimating high potential losses.  
 
Through these models, steadier markets appeared as less risky. As a 
consequence, the size of the amounts traded was allowed to increase with 
the blessing of rating agencies and regulators who used the same models.  
 
As more money was directed to these markets, price bubbles grew, returns 
increased, but VaR models that were based on long-term time series were 
only marginally affected by the recent rise in prices, masking the actual 
risk, while making these markets look even more attractive. 
 
When the bubble finally burst, financial institutions were faced with a 
catastrophic (Black Swan) event, that had never before appeared in the 
time series of their models. They were no longer dealing with the tail end 
of statistical curves based on past data, but with a complete shift of the 
curve itself to a new area that they could not identify. In other words, the 
situation had changed so much that the data previously used in their 
models had become irrelevant.  
 
Then, as an inevitable a flight to quality took place, pockets of illiquidity 
were created, other markets were affected, shifting the correlation factors 
between markets, on which these models had relied heavily to reduce 
aggregate risk. 
 
In the end, financial institutions faced vastly larger losses than they 
estimated and remained profoundly uncertain as to where and how far 
these uncharted currents will take them. This incertitude often led to a 
decision to withdraw brutally from these markets, further worsening the 
Financial 
institutions faced 




situation. The Far East crisis of 1998 and the LTCM debacle that followed 
are good examples of this pattern and should have alerted regulators to the 
simple fact that because economic history does not repeat itself, their 
modelling based on past data series was in times of instability, irreparably 
flawed.  In hindsight this underlying assumption represents an egregious 
error of staggering proportions.   
Second Trend: The Rise of Short-Term ‘ism’  
This trend has its roots in the 1970’s when the Carter administration, 
followed by his successors, pursued a vigorous policy of deregulation in 
response to a stagnating industrial sector. The policy was a success in 
terms of restructuring the US industrial base, making it more competitive 
and creating the conditions for strong economic development.  However, 
at the same time, tossed aside were several long-term stabilizing factors, 
such as life long careers in one company, loyalty to the firm, stable 
shareholding etc.... 
 
Under the threat of being acquired and broken up by raiders, it became a 
necessity for managements to deliver ever increasing profits quickly and 
predictably in order to sustain their companies stock prices.  The time 
horizon for CEOs was gradually reduced until it became the next quarter’s 
results.  This hunt for short-term profits also promoted changes in 
compensation from fixed salaries based on long-term performance to a 
culture of pay for performance, with its large bonuses and stock options 
linked to short-term performance.  
 
It was then a matter of time before the financial sector had to match these 
conditions to attract talent ready to take on increased risks. The 
formidable profits realised at first by venture capitalists then by hedge 
funds and private equity funds seemed to confirm the value of this 
approach in the financial sector. Soon, banks, which traditionally were an 
anchor of stability and prudence, were led by their managements to chase 
ever increasing short-term profits. 
 
During the same period, globalisation spread its wings with mostly positive 
effects.  Poverty retreated, especially in Asia, as global wealth increased. 
However, as US industrial jobs were shipped abroad and the notion of a 
long-term career with one company faded, the way to wealth - or at least  
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comfortable retirement for individuals as encouraged by the defined 
contribution retirement plans - implied short-term speculation. As 
individuals started to follow the path of industry and finance, the trend 
was greatly accelerated by the startling growth of the internet both in terms 
of providing investment opportunities, tools of money management and 
spreading information.  
 
Short term economic decisions based on market sentiment took over from 
this point on. 
Third Trend: Stabilizing Factors Disappear 
As long as the above mentioned weaknesses were confined to market 
activities, the problems remained manageable. The stock market 
rebounded from the 1987 crash: in 1998, the Far East crisis remained 
regional and did not pose a systemic risk to the world’s banks. 
 
Indeed, until the 1990s, the credit market remained an anchor of stability. 
Although some individual banks were quite leveraged, the market as a 
whole was well funded by stable customer deposits. Each bank had teams 
of seasoned commercial bankers and experienced risk managers who kept 
losses manageable in normal economic circumstances. The diversity of 
these lending and risk teams assured that any mistake made by one 
institution was not reproduced by the others and did not spread to the 
entire market. A stable global environment for credit activities was then 
maintained creating a general confidence in the interbank market. The 
outside auditing firms were happy to trust these seasoned teams and left to 
bank’s management the decisions about how much to provide for bad 
debts, while leaving the value of performing loans at face value (rather 
than applying the mark-to-market rules used in trading activities).  This 
attitude allowed bankers to support clients in times of passing difficulty, 
providing thus the long-term stability that borrowers needed.  Lending 
activity was a good provider of revenue, but was not conducive to rapid 
earning expansion. Bank managements in search of growth generally 
turned their attention to market and investment activities, thus preserving 
the strategic role of stable lending. 
 
In the early 90s things started to change and an unstoppable march to the 
present crisis began. The serious real estate crisis of those years which 








almost destroyed large institutions – such as Citibank – convinced banks 
that keeping such assets on their balance sheets was no longer advisable. 
They started ‘securitizing’ loans that they originated and selling them 
outside the banking industry to investors. A very active and liquid market 
quickly developed for these products. Related instruments became more 
complex as loans were aggregated in different ways to offer a wide 
selection of returns and risk rating to cover the needs of investors. This 
approach was particularly true for mortgage loans. Subsequently, banks 
decided that another way to protect themselves was risk insurance, and 
they created the credit default swap (‘CDS’) market which became 
attractive for insurance companies. 
 
All these ways of getting rid of on-balance sheet loans rapidly created a 
dangerous trend.  Bank managements learned that lending could be a 
profitable high-growth activity, provided that the loans were rapidly removed 
from the balance sheet. The traditional partnership with clients was then 
destroyed when their loans were sold as securities and ended up in the hands 
of non-banking institutions, such as pension funds, fund managers and high 
net worth individuals.  Clients gradually became aware that the loyalty that 
they had traditionally shown to their bank had become pointless. 
 
As credits became market instruments, a price was attached to them. 
Accountants then decided that some loans should be marked to market, 
introducing volatility into the banks loan portfolios and in their results. 
They acted in a deluded sense of conservative rigour and overlooked the 
fact that an efficient mark to market requires the availability of continuous 
pricing that in turn implies liquidity, namely a market in which the 
securitized loans could be bought and sold readily, just as FX and other 
money market instruments can be. 
 
Perhaps the most dangerous consequence was the concentration of risk 
assessment.  In order to create a market for loan instruments or ‘CDS’, it 
was clear that a unique and common measure of the underlying risk should 
be used by all the participants. The finance industry had then to rely 
entirely on rating agencies. The beneficial influence of dispersed, 
experienced individual bank risk departments waned in favour of a 
centralized – and external from the banks - assessment of risks by major 
rating agencies. Any mistake in modeling or judgement had subsequently 
far-reaching ‘systemic’ effects, a dramatic departure from the past. 








  It is important to underscore the fundamental responsibility of these 
agencies that provided the favourable ratings of the securitized 
instruments. Based on these ratings, the models assessed credits quality in 
terms of probability of default estimated for each rating through historical 
data – the same mistake as in the FX and short-term market models – 
without any consideration of the fact that the lending process itself had 
fundamentally changed with the elimination of individual bank credit 
assessments. 
 
At this juncture, the only thing that could have prevented a crisis in the US 
was a steady Federal Reserve policy and vigilant regulatory oversight. 
Unfortunately, since the 90s, the Fed itself had been infected by the short-
term approach. While reassured by the benign inflation, supported by 
global imports from low-cost manufacturing regions and an information-
technology induced rise in productivity, the Fed concentrated on its 
second mission to promote economic growth. Its board of governors 
adopted a short-term accommodating monetary policy, accentuating the 
growth periods and effectively countering any economic downturn. 
 
The stage was now ready for a major crisis to happen; and it did occur in 
the following sequence: 
 
After the internet bubble burst and the attack of 9/11, interest rates were 
brought way down to counter a deep recession; 
 
•  Investors, large and small, turned their attention to the real estate 
market that appeared more secure and was now affordable in view of 
low interest rates; 
   
•  Banks packaged huge amount of mortgage loans into CDOs and sold 
them; 
  
•  The rating agencies gave favourable ratings to these new types of 
securities; 
 
•  Based on these ratings and models rooted in past experience that 
implied low default probabilities, CDOs were bought in large 
quantities by banks, insurance companies and all sort of investors that 








the past.  
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were new to this field had little notion of the liquidity and counterparty 
risks they were assuming; 
 
•  When  mortgage defaults began rising and real estate prices started 
going down – a normal occurrence for any market -  the price of the 
securitized mortgage loans went down as well – an abnormal (Black 
Swan) occurrence viewed from the traditional lending experience; 
 
•  The overleveraging of the investment banks and the off-balance sheet 
Enron-like vehicles created by several large commercial banks made 
them very vulnerable to a systemic loss of confidence and loss of 
liquidity;  
 
•  The enormous quantity of the securitized paper sold into the bond 
markets posed a catastrophic systemic risk; 
 
•  Moreover as everyone steered clear of this type of paper, liquidity 
suddenly dried up: to everyone surprise! No liquidity meant no market 
price, and therefore a further mark down;  
 
•  As losses piled up, banks got suspicious of each other and the 
interbank lending market – let alone client lending– came to a stand 
still; 
 
•  The new accounting rules required a mark to market of these assets 
creating losses for financial institutions, a situation that translated into 
a loss of capital on the balance sheets of the banks;  
 
•  Central banks and governments were obliged to step in, further 
alarming the markets and accelerating the failures of banks; 
 
•  Once Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail causing a default of more 
than [$500] billion, trading ground to a halt in the short-term money 
markets and interbank lending; 
 
•  In view of the enormity of the securitized paper sold into the bond 
markets, the situation turned into the catastrophe in which we find 





And Now What’s Next? 
 
o far we have examined the causes of the financial crisis. It is 
important to understand how the present situation developed in 
order to correct past excesses but does it really help in predicting the 
future? 
 
Many commentators have analysed previous crisis in great detail to find 
some kind of pattern that would help them forecast what will happen this 
time around. This would be a worthy endeavour if it had any chance to 
succeed. However, the vast range of – sometimes contradicting – 
outcomes proposed does not give much confidence in their conclusions. 
 
Indeed, as we argued in the previous section, the past is not a reliable 
guide to future economic events. It is also clear by now that we are in 
completely uncharted territory. In this unsettled and fast changing 
environment, it becomes impossible to make a single definite prediction. 
Nevertheless, it is feasible to explore different scenarios and their possible 
consequences. 
 
We have selected three very different possibilities. They each represent an 
extreme situation that will probably not happen as such. However, they 
each lead to well-defined outcomes. As such, they could be relevant in 
assessing the future state of affairs when we emerge from the present 
confusion and a clearer course of events starts to correlate with one of the 
three scenarios. 
First scenario: A Quick and Painless Rebound 
Although in these depressed times this scenario seems implausible, there is 
actually a reasonable chance that it might happen.  Central banks have 
injected huge amounts of cash into the world’s banking systems, 
Governments have panicked and begun to give away hundreds of billions 
of tax payer money to the financial sector precisely in the hope of 
restoring previous conditions. Meanwhile, professional investors have 




equivalent. The consequence is that enormous liquidity is waiting on the 
sidelines.  
 
This creates an unstable equilibrium and a minor set of good news could 
trigger an unpredictably large stock market buying spree.  
 
Soon stock prices rush forward, short-term operators and hedge funds 
jump on the bandwagon pushing prices even higher. Then other markets 
recover as well and even if we do not reach pre-crisis levels, a sizeable 
recovery in assets prices occurs.  
 
When confidence returns and everyone feels better, the present 
consumption paralysis vanishes. Governments recoup, to a certain extent, 
their bailout investments. The pressure on politicians to intervene lessens.   
On this scenario, the only sector that takes time to recover is real estate. 
The main reason is that after such a major crisis, the conservative 
influence of risk departments in banks will be greatly enhanced. They will 
be in a position to impose very strict criteria for new mortgage lending, 
that they perceive wrongly as the main and perhaps only cause of past 
troubles.  As they fight the last war’s battles, they will restrict mortgage 
lending and slow down the real estate market for a while longer.  
 
Nevertheless, as the recovery progresses, all markets participants will want 
to revert quickly to business as usual and restore previous conditions, 
before permanent, structural damage is done to their industry.  This is true 
of course of banks, hedge funds and the like.  But it is also true of all 
parties who benefit from a vibrant financial sector and are threatened by 
any fundamental changes: namely, lawyers, accountants, rating agencies 
and even regulators (The Fed, to take an example, mentioned recently that 
they would like to see the mortgage securitization market recover soon).  
 
And then the good old days will be back. Or will they? 
 
It is clear that this scenario does not address any of the problems that 
caused this crisis in the first place.  It might even reinforce confidence in 
short-term fixes in what is perceived as an ever growing economy.   
Meanwhile, the same mistaken methodologies and policies would remain 
embedded in economic and political decisions. 
 
And then the 
good old days 
will be back.  
15 
Moreover, as market operators escape disaster, regulators, rating agencies 
and accounting firms will not feel any pressure to adjust their models and 
will consider the crisis as a freak event. 
 
It is then easy to see that financial crises will recur, perhaps more 
frequently.  Worse, as central banks inject greater amounts of liquidity each 
time around without reining in liquidity in good times, in order to avoid a 
healthy market correction, inflation will take off. This could be through 
increases of asset prices as has recently occurred or via a rapid rise of 
consumer prices affecting the inflation index. As interest rates rise and the 
bond market dips (as what happened during the 70s), downturns will 
increase in magnitude and create situations even more serious than the 
present one and this could very well lead to the second scenario. 
Whichever way, long-term effects will affect seriously the world economy.  
Second Scenario: Governments Spread their Wings 
At the other end of the spectrum can be found a completely different 
scenario. 
 
There is no quick rebound. The economy is seriously affected and lingers in a 
state of recession. The usual remedies, such as injecting liquidity, lowering 
interest rates and taxes do not appear to work. Governments, after having 
invested too much in bail outs of the financial and some industrial sectors, 
lack additional borrowing power to conduct a serious Keynesian stimulus 
policy.  
 
Most leaders worldwide and their advisors consider, after looking at recent 
downturns, that the ongoing one should not last more than two years. 
They seem totally unprepared for a much longer recession. 
  
Consequently, as unemployment mounts, markets collapse, pensions 
vanish and millions are forced into poverty, politicians will be under 
enormous pressure to ‘do something’.  As each government scrambles to 
save its own economy, it will dedicate whatever resources it has to self-
preservation rather than in a concerted effort to help the world economy.  
International solidarity will gradually break down. As a matter of fact, 
several recent events point in this direction, such as the Great Britain/ 
Iceland dispute over deposits gathered by Icelandic banks from UK 
There is no quick 
rebound.  
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residents, or the promises by US presidential candidates to review NAFTA 
in order to protect workers’ jobs in the US. 
 
The temptation for governments to interfere with the financial system will 
become great, even to the extent perhaps of launching commissions to 
identify the factors responsible for the crash; as in 1987 when futures (a 
product never mentioned in the present crisis) were singled out as the 
main culprit of that crash.  
 
Initially, the obvious scapegoats would be markets operators, such as 
hedge funds, bank trading rooms and short sellers.  As they get targeted, 
these indispensable contributors to maintaining market liquidity will 
reduce their activities, further compounding the market collapse.  Longer 
term, innovation in all areas will suffer as the financial risk takers that have 
been instrumental in promoting progress through funding of start ups will 
be in retreat. 
 
Then, as these measures fail, lenders will become the next scapegoats to 
finger. Governments, having advanced large sums of money to banks, 
often becoming their largest shareholder, will be tempted to dictate 
lending policies. As a matter of fact, some European governments have 
already started to complain loudly about the restrictive credit and mortgage 
policies of the financial institutions they have helped. When, inevitably as a 
result of this interference, the quality of loan portfolios deteriorate, so will 
the credit ratings of the banks.  As counterparties, they will be considered 
only as good as the support they get from their respective government.  A 
similar situation prevailed with banks in communist countries in the 1970s 
and1980s.  
 
And this is where the main danger lies: governments will be fronting for 
the financial system of their respective countries. Then they will become 
themselves the main victims of the next confidence crisis; right at the 
point when their uncontrolled bail out programs will have depleted the last 
of their borrowing capacity.   
 
Then who will governments turn to for help?  
 
Certainly not the international institutions - IMF, World Bank – who have 
very limited means compared to the enormous scale of the financial 
Governments 
will be fronting 
for the financial 




bailouts we are witnessing. Certainly not to other countries that will have 
reverted by then to extreme financial protectionism.  
 
In reality there will be no one to turn to. 
 
Carried to its logical end, this scenario leads to a full-fledged depression 
with potentially more serious down side consequences than we have ever 
experienced. In that respect, the current situation of Iceland represents a 
warning shot that should be considered carefully 
Third scenario: The Balanced Approach 
As a consequence of our analysis, the most constructive way out of the 
present crisis seems to lie in a progressive and balanced return to a proper 
risk /reward structure in the economy.  However, this transition has to be 
conducted in a responsible manner by all participants within their own 
spheres of competence, without destroying the risk taking culture that has 
brought innovation and progress to the whole economy.  
1.  Governments 
First and foremost, our leaders should avoid giving the impression that 
they are panicking, and are simply throwing billions of taxpayer money at 
every economic bush fire. In fact, politicians will have to be extremely 
patient and recognize that any scenario that does not include a quick 
rebound implies a somewhat protracted recession. 
 
Governments will have to resist political pressure and save their bailout 
firepower for use only in cases that represent extreme systemic risk for the 
economy.  Once bailouts are made, such investments should remain 
passive and resold as soon as favourable market conditions return.  
 
Meanwhile, it will be much more important for them to sustain the 
economy through demand stimulus policies. 
 
In previous post war economic crises, consumers –mostly US consumers– 
saved the world from economic collapse. This time around, they have 
been panicked by the authorities’ inability to control the crisis. They are 
heavily indebted and seem to no longer have either the will or the capacity 
to come to the rescue. Meanwhile, as their sales collapse, businesses are 
This scenario 




clearly in no position to pick up the slack either. In fact they will rapidly 
curtail their investments and lay off staff as it is already clearly apparent. 
  
The only solution then is for governments to become ‘the spenders of last 
resort’. However, policies of either throwing money at the private sector 
which is in survival mode, or of putting cash in the pockets of individuals 
via tax rebates who won’t spend, simply won’t suffice. Governments must 
start buying goods and services urgently if they want to avoid the economy 
going into a tail spin. 
  
Sizeable long-term investment projects, particularly in the areas of 
advanced infrastructure and energy, a classic Keynesian approach, have to 
be launched right away. Upgrading aging infrastructure is badly needed in 
many countries. Transforming our way of life away from an oil-based 
society is now an ecological must. These types of useful investments will 
not only create jobs and  restore confidence but also lead to long-term 
economic viability, a much needed counterweight to the short term ‘ism ’ 
of recent years.  
2.  Central Banks  
Central Banks have the responsibility to fight inflation. Surprisingly, prices 
of assets that affect economic decisions of households (such as real estate 
or stock market holdings) have never been included in the formula for 
inflation. 
 
If this had been the case, the level of interest rates would have risen, long 
before several potentially dangerous financial bubbles could have reached 
a system-threatening size. One way or another, Central Banks need to 
identify these bubbles and to act early to restrain them. 
3.  Regulators 
Regulators have a pivotal role to play. For one thing, having a proper 
risk/reward policy requires proper risk measurement. It will be the 
regulators urgent responsibility to coordinate a review of current risk 
models with academics and market participants. As far as market risk is 
concerned, clearly the methodology used to conduct stress tests has to be 
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Beyond that, regulators will have to curb excesses in financial institutions 
that induced excessive and often irresponsible risk taking. These include:  
large remuneration given to traders without accountability for subsequent 
losses; blind faith in rating agencies’ reduced reliance on traditional and 
experienced credit risk departments.  
  
Meanwhile, regulators should also resist pressure to create new rules that 
will directly interfere with the functioning and risk appetite of institutions. 
They should, as advocated in the UK, impose extra capital requirements 
for risky policies instead of simply ruling them out completely.  This 
approach will deter some institutions from taking undue risks and solidify 
the capital of the ones prepared to take them. More importantly, it will 
preserve a healthy risk culture so important to support innovation. 
 
Finally, regulation should extend to key service providers such as legal 
firms, auditing firms and rating agencies to make sure that they act in an 
ethical manner and within the confines of their demonstrated competence. 
4.  Financial Institutions 
There are clearly many measures that financial institutions will have to 
take. It is not the purpose of this presentation to describe them in detail 
but two points seem particularly important.  
 
The first one concerns risk management. It is obvious that all financial 
institutions will undertake a profound revision of their approach to risk. In 
doing so, they  will need first to clearly separate market risk and credit risk 
not only in terms of risk appetite, capital allocation but also in setting up 
their risk departments in a way that will recognize the two different type of 
skills that are required. Market risk supervisors should be familiar with the 
appropriate statistical approach but also be imaginative as they will have to 
reconsider their models and improve them to incorporate the possibility of 
future crises of a type never seen before. Credit facilities (they represent 
70% of bank losses historically) on the other hand should be recognized as 
long-term commitments and managed by experienced bankers with old-
fashioned prudence.  
 
At the same time, managements should also be careful to preserve the risk 
appetite of their institution even in the face of mounting losses: this is the 










careful to state clearly their risk policy and keep their risk professionals 
within the confines of their responsibilities. 
  
The second point concerns the quality of staff. Financial institutions 
should resist the new ‘politically correct’ attitude of vigorously restraining 
remuneration and bonuses below market levels. Indeed, if the financial 
sector becomes less competitive in attracting talent, financial innovation 
will suffer and so will economic progress as a whole in the long run. Of 
course, bonuses have to be more risk- and time-weighted in the future in 
order to ensure that employee contributions create quality earnings. 
However, the industry as a whole should remain competitive and attractive 
for talented young professionals. 
5.   Directors  
In recent years, it has been very difficult for directors to keep up with the 
ever increasing sophistication – or even complication – of financial 
products. The understanding of the statistical methods underlying the risk 
measurement and the adequacy of the stress tests does not come with 
experience but requires appropriate training. The losses suffered by 
financial institutions but also other companies that have invested in this 
type of products show that managements were not sufficiently challenged 
by their board. Evidently, this crisis has come as a surprise to all parties 
involved including managements, professionals and operators and 
therefore directors were not in any better position to anticipate it. 
 
However, and in view of their personal responsibilities, directors will have 
from now on to learn more about modern risk management in order to 









s described, these scenarios are extreme and it will be very 
surprising that any of them develops in its pure form for the 
following reasons: 
 
The magnitude of the present market retreat makes the first scenario 
difficult to imagine.  
 
The second one which seems to have the most pull right now is also the 
most dangerous and the hope is that politicians in well-balanced 
democracies will resist it in time. 
 
As for the third scenario, it is a long-term and complex process that 
require inspired and serene leadership, patience as well as political courage; 
undoubtedly a very unusual mix nowadays. 
 
However, the trends that will no doubt soon become evident will indicate 
the future path of events. If they somewhat align with one of these 
scenarios, it will be possible to a certain extent to foretell the type of 
consequences to be expected. At this stage, the fear is that a continuing 
quick deterioration of the economy takes us along the path of the second 
scenario. 
 
The hope is that some of the measures already taken create a moderate 
rebound in the markets. As the threat of immediate collapse recedes, it will 
create the necessary conditions for a more balanced interaction between 
the various participants: financial industry, regulators, governments that 
will lead through some trial and error to a solution approaching the third 
scenario. Then, after an inevitable recession, most of the structural 
shortcomings that created this crisis would be corrected giving rise to a 
new start provided that, as President Mitterrand once said “One leaves 
time to time”. 
A 
CONCLUSION
“One leaves time 

























The CIRANO Finance Groupe has prepared an interactive application that permits the user to chart various 
financial and economic time series against the backdrop of the major events of the past year. The application 
can be found at the above address and is available to all. 
 
The user may choose among 24 series grouped according to various categories: Stock Market Indices, Stock 
Market Volatility, Corporate Credit Indices, Housing, Interest Rates Inflation. Up to three series may be 
chosen for display, and the axes for each series appear at the right, left and middle of the display in the order 
the series is chosen. A series may be removed and replaced with another. The user may also choose the 
desired time frame for display in one of two ways. The period  may be chosen directly by selectting one of 
the options available at the top of the graph; alternatively, a period may be chosen by dragging the vertical 
borders of the bottom display. 
 
Historical events are indicated by boxed letters within the display. The user may click on a letter to be 
directed to the event in question that is displayed with date on the right. An associated pop up [available for 
some events] gives a short description of the event with a link to a news source. Data will be added on a 
regular basis. 
 




In trying to organize an economic framework for assessing the events of the past year, we have found a 
number of commentaries to be particularly useful These are organized around several themes. A short 
account of the article is given along with a link to the web site where the complete article may be accessed. 
This initiative is very much a work in progress and will be revised from time to time. 
 











id fair value accounting play a role in the current financial crisis? 
This appendix explores the issue. Fair value accounting implies 
that assets and liabilities get measured and reflected on a firm`s financial 
statements at their market value, or close substitutes. Extensive academic 
research done over the past 20 years shows that financial statements that 
reflect the market values of assets or liabilities provide information that is 
relevant to investors. In other context, fair value accounting is just a 
messenger carrying bad news. In contrast, there is also another research 
stream which is quite critical of the perceived merits of fair value 
accounting, and which worries about how it undermines what constitutes 
the core of financial reporting. More specifically, it is argued that fair value 
accounting is difficult to verify, may be based on unreliable assumptions or 
hypotheses and provides management with too much discretion into the 
preparation of financial statements. Hence, according to this view, fair 
value accounting is not necessarily a neutral or unbiased messenger. 
Moreover, fair value accounting creates a circular dynamic in financial 
reporting, with markets providing the input for the measurement of many 
assets, thus affecting reported earnings which are then used by analysts 
and investors to assess a firm’s market value. If markets become volatile, 
as has been the case in recent months, reported earnings also become 
more volatile, thus feeding investors apprehensions. Therefore, since fair 
value accounting is associated with more volatile and less conservative 
financial statements and, it may have allowed managers to delay the day of 
recognition as well as distorted investors and regulators’ perceptions of 
financial performance and stability at the end of the financial bubble. 
However, once the economic pendulum swung back, fair value accounting 
may have magnified their views as to the severity of the current financial 




Despite its almost universal adoption by accounting standard setters, the 
merits of fair value accounting continue to generate intense and passionate 
debates among academics, businesspeople, regulators or investors. A 
surprising element underlying these debates is the apparent irreconcilable 
positions adopted by participants in favour or against fair value 
accounting. However, the current financial crisis has significantly raised 
the level and stakes in that discussion, with fair value accounting 
increasingly being under attack. For instance, the U.S. Congress recently 
mandated the Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate and 
report on fair value accounting’s contribution to the financial crisis. In 
reaction, some standard setters such as the Canada’s Accounting Standards 
Board, the Financial Accounting Standard Board and the International 
Accounting Standard Board have recently introduced temporary 
provisions waiving some aspects of fair value accounting for financial 
institutions. 
 
The purpose of the Appendix is to provide additional insights into the role 
played by fair value accounting in the financial crisis. Since the crisis is still 
ongoing, there is no direct or formal empirical evidence about such role, 
which may be perceived, actual or potential. However, by analyzing the 
conceptual and empirical foundations of fair value accounting, it may be 
possible to draw some inferences and to assess if and how fair value 
accounting underlies some of the recent turmoil in financial markets.  In 
that regard, the Appendix aims to achieve the following objectives. First, I 
intend to provide a brief overview of fair value accounting, including its 
impact on financial statements. The overview includes a summary of the 
opposite viewpoints on the merits of fair value accounting. Second, I 
present and discuss the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of fair 
value accounting. Thirdly, I analyze the measurement and valuation 
challenges that arise from the use of fair value accounting. Finally, on the 
basis of the above analyses, I sketch a tentative framework to understand 
fair value accounting’s role and potential contribution to the financial 
crisis. While fair value accounting can conceptually apply to all aspects of a 
firm’s financial statements, I will purposefully focus on its application to 
financial instruments and financial institutions.  
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Context 
Fair value is defined as the price at which an asset could be exchanged in a 
current transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties.
1 For liabilities, 
fair value is defined as the amount that would be paid to transfer the 
liability to a new debtor. Under fair value accounting (FVA), assets and 
liabilities are categorized according to the level of judgment (subjectivity) 
associated with the inputs to measure their fair value, with three (3) levels 
being considered.  At level 1, financial instruments are measured and 
reported on a firm’s balance sheet and income statement at their market 
value, which typically reflects the quoted prices for identical assets or 
liabilities in active markets. It is assumed that the quoted price for an 
identical asset or liability in an active market provides the most reliable fair 
value measurement because it is directly observable to the market (« mark-
to-market »).  However, if valuation inputs are observable, either directly 
or indirectly, but do not qualify as Level 1 inputs, the Level 2 fair value 
assessment of a financial instrument will reflect a) quoted prices for similar 
financial instruments in active markets, b) quoted prices for identical or 
similar financial instruments in markets that are not active, c) inputs other 
than quoted prices but which are observable (e.g., yield curve) or d) 
correlated prices. Finally, certain financial instruments which, for example, 
are customized or have no market, will be valued by a reporting entity on 
the basis of assumptions that presumably reflect market participants’ views 
and assessments (e.g., private placement investments, unique derivative 
products, etc.). Such valuation is deemed to be derived from Level 3 
inputs and is commonly referred as “mark-to-model” since it is often the 
outcome of a mathematical modelling exercise with various assumptions 
about economic, market or firm-specific conditions. 
2 In all cases, any 
unrealized gain (or loss) on financial instruments held by an institution 
translates into an increase (decrease) in its stockholders’ equity and, 
consequently, an improvement (deterioration) in its capitalization ratios. 
3 
 
                                                   
1Financial Accounting Standards Board. 2006. Financial Accounting Standard 157 - Fair 
Value Measurements. Norwalk, CT. 
2 For more details, see FAS 157 and FAS 159 - The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and 
Financial Liabilities.  
3 Currently, while all unrealized gains or losses on financial instruments do affect a firm’s 
stockholders’ equity, they do not necessarily directly affect its reported net earnings. Some 
gains or losses may flow through an intermediate performance measure which is labelled Other 
comprehensive income and which is distinct from reported net earnings.    
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Detractors, among them David Dodge, the former Governor of the Bank 
of Canada, argue vehemently that FVA has accelerated and amplified the 
current financial crisis.
4 Their argument can be summarized as follows. 
Starting in 2007, the drop in the price of many types of financial 
instruments led financial institutions to mark down the asset values 
reported on their balance sheets, thus weakening their capitalization ratios 
(let’s think about the first write-offs following the start of the subprime 
crisis). To improve their financial profile and to enhance their safety zone 
with respect to regulatory capital requirements, these institutions started to 
sell securities or close down positions on some financial instruments in 
markets that were increasingly shallow as a result of the emergence of a 
liquidity crisis. These sales magnified the downdraft in quoted prices, thus 
bringing additional devaluations, etc. Along these lines, William Isaac, 
former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
argues that “mark-to-market accounting has been extremely and needlessly 
destructive of bank capital in the past year and is a major cause of the 
current credit crisis and economic downturn”.
5 
 
However, FVA can count on broad support from the accounting 
profession, standard setters and regulators. For instance, in a recent 
speech, Nick Le Pan, Canada’s former Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions, argued that FVA is only a messenger and should not be 
criticized for merely reflecting the poor underlying economic outlook.
6 
Barbara Roper, from the Consumer Federation of America, argues that 
sound accounting principles, such as FVA, led to the exposure of 
underlying problem assets. In her view, FVA provides more accurate, 
timely and comparable information to investors than any other accounting 
alternative. 
                                                   
4 See McFarland, J. and J. Partridge. 2008. Mark-to-market' accounting rules fuel debate. The 
Globe and Mail – Report on Business. November 20. 
5 Jeffrey, G. 2008. Mark market debate down as a draw. The Bottom Line, December, p. 27. 
6 McFarland, J. and J. Partridge. Idem.  
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Theoretical and Empirical Foundations Underlying FVA  
FVA’s theoretical and empirical premises are relatively solid. In fact, it is 
one of the few accounting standard that can be traced back directly to 
accounting-based scientific research. More specifically, there is consistent 
empirical evidence, accumulated over the past 20 years, that a firm’s stock 
price is more closely associated with the market value of its underlying 
financial or real assets than with their historical cost, i.e., their purchase 
price plus related expenses.
7 The superior relevance of market-derived 
values is even more obvious in the case of financial derivatives which 
historical cost is often close to zero but which market value can fluctuate 
widely.
8 In other words, fair values, or marked to market values, have been 




An interesting early study on the relevance and implications from FVA 
was performed by Bernard, Merton and Palepu (1995). For many years, 
Denmark’s accounting standard-setting and banking regulatory authorities 
have relied on mark-to-market valuation for the assets of their commercial 
banks.
10 Bernard, Merton and Palepu find that Danish banks’ book values, 
which reflect mark-to-market valuations, seem to provide more reliable 
information to investors than historical cost-based figures then provided 
by U.S. banks. Moreover, they do not find evidence that Danish bank 
                                                   
7 See, among many papers, Barth, M E, W H Beaver and W R Landsman. 2001. The relevance 
of the value relevance literature for accounting standard setting: another view.  Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 31, pp 77–104; Landsman, W.R. 2006. Fair Value Accounting for 
Financial Instruments: Some Implications for Bank Regulation. Bank for International 
Settlements Paper.  
8 Venkatachalam, M. 1996. Value-relevance of banks’ derivatives disclosures. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 22, pp 327–55. 
9 While studies take many different forms, the most widely used approach closely resembles 
the following (simplified version of a regression): 
Priceit = β0 + β1Assets(at costs)it + β2Liabilitiesit + β3Unrealized Gain(Loss)it 
Where i represents a specific firm, and t, a given year-end. Variables are measured in $, in $ per 
share, or standardized by proxies for firm size. Price equals a firm’s stock market price while 
both Assets and Liabilities are as on the balance sheet (consistent with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles). Unrealized Gains(Losses) reflect the difference between an asset 
market value (according to FVA) and its book value (according to GAAP). FVA-measured 
information is deemed to be more relevant for investors if results from the regression model 
show that β3 is positive and statistically significant. 
10 Bernard, V., R. Merton, and K. Palepu (1995). Mark-to-Market Accounting for Banks and 
Thrifts: Lessons from the Danish Experience. Journal of Accounting Research 33 (Spring), 1-32.  
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executives manipulate mark-to-market numbers to circumvent regulatory 
capital ratios. However, they also point out that that the Danish and U.S. 
capital markets are not quite similar and that their findings may not 
completely hold in a U.S. setting. 
 
On the basis of these empirical findings, many accounting professors have 
actively lobbied standard setters such as the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board to 1) introduce FVA into financial statements, initially 
through footnote disclosure, 2) gradually reduce the relative scope of 
historical cost-derived assets and liabilities in financial reporting and, 3) 
modify the conceptual framework underlying standard setting to state 
more clearly that the primary goal of financial reporting is to provide 
information that is relevant to investors (presumably, stock market 
investors) and that, as such, FVA should be emphasized over historical 
cost
11 Academic research’s influence over the standard setting process has 
been greatly enhanced by the involvement of many leading accounting 
professors favouring FVA into the decision-making process of standard 
setters or regulators such as the FASB or the SEC.
12 In that regard, it is 
important to note that there is currently a joint project between FASB and 
the IASB to adopt a unique conceptual framework for accounting 
standard-setting. The draft framework, which should be adopted within 
the next year, clearly states that the main purpose of financial reporting is 
to provide information that is relevant for investors, with emphasis on 
market values and cash flow forecasts as the most critical drivers 
underlying financial reporting.
13 
                                                   
11 For instance, as early as 2000, the Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the 
American Accounting Association stated that “..The Committee generally supports the FASB 
position that financial instruments be reported in the financial statements at fair 
value...”(Wahlen, J., J.R. Boatsman, R.H. Herz, G. J. Jonas, K.G. Palepu, S.G. Ryan, K. 
Schipper, C.M. Schrand, D.J. Skinner. 2000. Response to the FASB Preliminary Views: 
Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value. 
Accounting Horizons 14(4), 501-508). 
12 For instance, a leading proponent of FVA, Katherine Schipper, from Duke University 
(formerly a professor at the University of Chicago) and former President of the American 
Accounting Association, was a member of the FASB between 2001 and 2006. One of the 
researchers who pioneered empirical work on FVA, Mary Barth, a professor at Stanford 
University (formerly at Harvard University) is currently a member of the International 
Accounting Standards Board and was previously involved in the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants and FASB. 
13 Financial Accounting Standards Board. 2008. Conceptual Framework for Financial 
Reporting: The Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics and 
Constraints of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information. Exposure-Draft.  
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Measurement and Valuation Challenges 
Despite its many tangible or perceived benefits to investors, the adoption 
and use of FVA undermines several critical foundations of financial 
reporting to which we have become accustomed. More specifically, the 
implementation of FVA explicitly confirms the primacy of financial 
markets and of investors in the determination of accounting standards. 
Essentially, the broader social issues and implications arising from 
accounting standards for stakeholders beyond investors are assumed away.  
 
The potential danger of relying on capital markets-based findings to 
directly prescribe accounting standard has been highlighted more than 30 
years ago by Gonedes and Dopuch (1974).
14 Following a first wave of 
capital markets-based studies that mapped their findings directly into 
standard-setting issues, Gonedes and Dopuch explain that observing an 
empirical relation between accounting amounts and equity prices or 
returns does not provide sufficient evidence about the desirability or 
effects of a particular standard, even if markets are informational efficient. 
Their conclusion rests on the fact that accounting standards are essentially 
a public good. Therefore, standard setters’ mandate and responsibility is to 
develop standards after making the appropriate social welfare trade-offs, 
which do involve more parties than just investors. Hence, deciding about a 
particular accounting standard requires that social preferences be specified.  
From a different perspective, Holthausen and Watts (2001) put forward 
the argument that the value-relevance literature has little to say about 
standard-setting issues.
15 In their view, without an underlying theory that 
explains, predicts and links accounting, standard setting, and valuation, 
value-relevance studies simply report associations. 
 
Other conceptual foundations of traditional financial reporting are also set 
aside to effectively implement FVA. On one hand, emphasis on value 
relevance implies that accounting conservatism a remnant of the past. 
Within a conservatism perspective, financial statements anticipate bad 
news, i.e., before a transaction is actually done or concluded: hence, an 
asset is written down if it is deemed that it has suffered  a permanent 
                                                   
14 Gonedes, N., and Dopuch, N. (1974). ‘Capital market equilibrium, information production, 
and selecting accounting techniques: Theoretical framework and review of empirical work’. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 12: 48–129. 
15 Holthausen, R.W., R.L. Watts. 2001. The relevance of the value-relevance literature for 
financial accounting standard setting. Journal of Accounting & Economics 31 (1-3), 3-75.  
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impairment or if expected economic conditions suggest that the firm will 
not be able to recover its value. Moreover, such write-down is permanent, 
i.e., the asset will not be re-evaluated upward in the future even if 
economic conditions change in the meantime. Still within a conservatism 
perspective, financial statements will only reflect good news if there is an 
arms’ length transaction: the impact of any appreciation in the value of an 
asset or of the signature of a new contract will be reflected on a firm’s 
financial statements only the asset is actually sold. In contrast, within a 
FVA perspective, both realized and unrealized losses and gains are 
recognized on financial statements. Moreover, assets that have been 
marked down can be re-evaluated upward. As an accounting principle, 
conservatism traces its roots back to the financial scandals that marked the 
early twentieth century. Interestingly, some of the firms involved in these 
scandals were actually using variants of FVA.
16 The Enron case also 
illustrates the potential negative consequences from dropping 
conservatism and replacing it with mark-to-market accounting, with 
management strategically selecting bid or ask prices to value its energy 
contracts. Enron was a key market-maker or, sometimes, the only market-
maker, in some markets, thus facilitating managerial discretion.
17 
 
Reliability as well as verifiability are other financial statements qualities that 
may be severely undermined by the use of FVA. In light of its emphasis 
on investor relevance, FVA heavily relies on the estimation of future cash 
flows or on market-based values. However, as we all know, it is impossible 
to know the future: one can validate only the rigour and reasonableness of 
hypotheses and assumptions underlying a forecast. From that standpoint, 
even market values are essentially forecasts of expected future cash flows. 
Such a situation provides a striking contrast to historical cost, for which it 
is possible to verify exactly what is an asset’s purchase price, as well as 
related acquisition costs. Furthermore, in the case of financial instruments 
that are not traded on an organized market, their valuation for financial 
reporting purposes relies on numerous assertions by management, 
assumptions about the appropriate benchmarks or markets, or the 
reasonableness of a valuation model inputs. Some recent studies show that 
                                                   
16 For example, see Flesher, D. L. and T. Flesher, 1986, Ivar Kreuger's contribution to U.S. 
financial reporting, The Accounting Review 61 (3): 421-434. Cudahy, R.D.. and W.D. Henderson. 
2005. From Insull To Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After The Rise And Fall Of Two 
Energy Icons. Energy Law Journal 26 (1), 35-110.  
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FVA provides corporate managers with greater discretion in the 
measurement and recognition of assets and liabilities, thus potentially 
undermining their reliability. For instance, focusing on accounting for 
stock options, Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (2004) find that managers 
select valuation model parameters to strategically manage estimates of 
disclosed employee stock option fair values. Their finding raises the 
broader question of whether managers will behave similarly when selecting 
model parameters for fair value estimates of other financial instruments.
18  
 
FVA implicitly assumes that, at the end of each reporting period, an entity 
sells its assets or settles its liabilities at market or model-estimated prices at 
that same time. A liquidation balance sheet is not prepared very differently. 
However, such a view contradicts the going concern assumption which 
essentially states that a firm is expected to continue its operations for the 
medium to long term. The going concern assumption is needed for the 
preparation of regular and consistent financial statements as it underlies 
the reported values of many other assets and liabilities beyond financial 
instruments.  
 
By emphasizing market- or model-based measurement, the use of FVA 
also affects the relative role of accountants in the preparation of financial 
statements. While historical cost-based financial statements are squarely 
under the control of accountants, FVA-derived assets and liabilities often 
require the expertise of other professionals such as actuaries, valuation 
experts or financial engineers, with accountants being more likely to play a 
secondary role, e.g., verifying underlying assumptions, hypotheses, etc.  
FVA and the Financial Crisis: Some Thoughts 
It is still too early to conclude on FVA’s role in the current financial crisis: 
not all data is available, additional analyses must be completed and all its 
consequences cannot be observed. However, relying on prior research 
findings and on available data, it is possible to draw some inferences about 
the contribution of FVA to the financial crisis.  
 
                                                                                                                          
17 Weil, R. 2001. After Enron, “mark to market” accounting gets scrutiny. Wall Street Journal 
(December 4). 
18 Aboody, D., Mary E. Barth, and Ron kasznik. 2004. Firms' voluntary recognition of stock-
based compensation expense. Journal of Accounting Research 42(2), 123-150.  
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More Volatile Financial Results 
Most prior research shows that the adoption of FVA translates into more 
volatile financial results (earnings).
19 Hence, financial markets’ extreme 
volatility over the past two years has contributed to raise financial 
institutions’ volatility, potentially amplifying the perception by investors, 
regulators and governments as to the seriousness of the crisis. More 
practically, the drop in reported earnings is even more dramatic in light of 
the record earnings reported in prior years, with FVA pushing down 
earnings in the current period but boosting earnings in prior years. Two 
examples illustrate the potential impact of FVA on the volatility of 
reported earnings.  
 
Crédit Suisse: Within the context of the subprime crisis, the stock market 
value of most financial institutions depends extensively upon investors’ 
assessment of their direct and indirect exposure to subprime-related loans 
or derivatives. The valuation information disclosed by financial institutions 
that evolve in the same markets largely influences such an assessment, with 
more recent market quotes driving such valuation. In that regard, the saga 
surrounding Crédit Suisse’s release of its 2007 earnings is quite 
enlightening. On February 12, 2008, Crédit Suisse reports record income 
from continuous operations of 8.5 billion Swiss Francs. On February 19, 
2008, Crédit Suisse announces that some additional control processes have 
led to the repricing of certain asset-backed positions in its Structured 
Credit Trading business, with the current total fair value reduction of these 
positions being reduced by an estimated $U.S. 2.85 billion. Finally, on 
March 20, 2008, Crédit Suisse reports that its 2007 operating income has 
been revised downward by 1.18 billion Swiss Francs (789 million Swiss 
Francs after tax), close to a 10% difference with the initially reported 
figure. The Crédit Suisse story illustrates the difficulty of pinning down the 
fair value of many assets when the underlying valuation methodology is 
complex and subject to shifting hypotheses and assumptions about the 
future. Crédit Suisse`s experience also shows that reported results for a 
given period may be subject to a wide margin of error, or discretion, or 
even restated. 
                                                   
19 For example, Barth, Landsman and Wahlen (1995) show that fair value-based measures of 
net income are more volatile than historical cost-based measures (Barth, Mary E, Landsman, 
Wayne R, Wahlen, James M.1995. Fair value accounting: Effects on banks' earnings volatility, 
regulatory capital, and value of contractual cash flows. Journal of Banking & Finance 19 (3-4), 
577-605).  
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Lehman Brothers: In its last reported financial statements before it went 
bankrupt, Lehman Brothers reported a loss of $U.S. 2.4 billion for the first six 
months ended May 31, 2008 (vs. a net income of $U.S. 2.4 billion for the first 
six months ended May 31, 2007). The shift of $U.S. 4.8 billion in net income 
is largely driven by a dramatic fall of $U.S. 8.5 billion in Lehman’s  revenues 
from principal transactions, which include realized and unrealized gains or 
losses from financial instruments and other inventory positions owned. A 
significant portion of the downward shift in principal transactions revenues is 
actually explained by unrealized losses of $U.S. 1.6 billion in the first semester 
of 2008 vs. unrealized gains of $U.S. 200 million in the first semester of 2007. 
Thus, accounting at fair value for some financial assets amplified Lehman’s 
downward earnings performance. 
 
Hence, it can be put forward that FVA, through its magnifying impact on 
earnings volatility, may have contributed to aggravate investors’, 
regulators’ and governments’ perceptions with respect to the severity of 
the crisis, itself characterized by record volatility in the prices of many 
securities and goods.  
 
On a related note, the increased volatility brought forward by FVA is 
conducive to the use of equity-based compensation, especially stock 
options, which value is then enhanced (according to the Black-Scholes 
model, volatility is one of the key inputs in option valuation). Prior 
research suggests that there is a strong association between performance 
volatility and the use of stock options.
20 Through FVA, the outcomes 
from aggressive risk-taking in investment and financing strategies will 
directly flow into reported earnings, thus further leveraging the potential 
gains to be derived from stock options and other incentives. Many 
financial institutions involved in the current crisis made extensive use of 
stock options and other incentives, allowing unrealized gains on assets to 
be converted into cold hard cash.  
Does FVA Reflect Underlying Business Performance or Allow Financial Institutions 
to Delay the Day of Recognition? 
Some of the fiercest critics of FVA argue that, far from enhancing 
transparency and relevant financial reporting, it actually provides corporate 
                                                   
20 See, for example, Magnan, Michel. 2006. Les options sur actions : création de richesse pour 
les actionnaires ou enrichissement des dirigeants au détriment des actionnaires ? Finance-
contrôle-strategie 9(3): 221-235.  
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managements with ways to avoid the day of recognition and to delay asset 
impairments. In other words, the adoption FVA undermines financial 
statements’ conservatism and leads to changes in managerial behaviour. 
For instance, Ross Watts (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) argues 
that the elimination of conservatism brought by FVA leads to the 
capitalization of unverifiable future cash flows unto the balance sheet.
21 
22 
Such unverifiability and managerial opportunities to make strategic 
valuation choices introduce significant noise into the financial reporting 
process that may be costly to investors. Moreover, by moving firms away 
from transaction-based accounting, FVA is contradicting SEC efforts to 
tighten revenue measurement and recognition standards to ensure that 
only completed sales transactions get reported into the financial statements 
and affect earnings.
23 Experience shows that, until the advent of SAB 101, 
several firms had applied aggressive revenue recognition criteria that 
dramatically boosted reported earnings and growth rates. Earnings 
restatements following the enactment of SAB 101 were often sizable and 
led to significant stock price falls, even if reported cash flows were not 
affected. In other words, conservative accounting provides information 
that is useful beyond the estimated cash flows from a particular contract 
and protects investors and creditors from managerial opportunism.  
The case of Lehman Brothers illustrates Ross’ argument. As of November 
30, 2007, 75.1% of assets measured at fair value were measured according 
to Level 2 or Level 3 inputs. In other words, the large majority of assets 
supposedly valued at fair value were not valued on the basis of directly 
observable quoted prices. By May 31, 2008, that proportion had increased 
to 81.7% of assets measured at fair value, suggesting that barely 18% of 
assets supposedly valued according to FVA were “marked to market”. 
Further empirical work as well as the liquidation of Lehman Brothers will 
provide additional evidence regarding the extent to which its assets may 
                                                   
21 Watts, Ross. 2003. Conservatism in accounting part I: Explanations and Implications. 
Accounting Horizons 17(3), 207-221. 
22 There is empirical evidence that effective auditing of FVA derived numbers requires very 
specialized valuation knowledge which may be difficult for auditors to gain and maintain 
(Martin, R.D., J.S. Rich, T.J. Wilks. 2006. Auditing Fair Value Measurements: A Synthesis of 
Relevant Research. Accounting Horizons 20(3), 287-303. 
23 For instance, in 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued Staff Accounting 
Bulletin 101 - Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements which prescribes specific criteria 
to indicate when a transaction has been concluded, thus considerably reducing managerial 
discretion in the recognition of revenues. In contrast, fair value accounting does not rely on 
the conclusion of a transaction to estimate the value of an financial asset or contract.  
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have been overstated or purposely shifted into Levels 2 or 3 to hide 
developing losses and give management more discretion. At the very least, 
its actions suggest that FVA reporting may work well for investors when 
assets trade in deep and efficient markets but may become less transparent 
when market conditions become more difficult or less liquid. On that 
note, it is telling that Lehman Brothers was an early adopter of both SFAS 
157 (Fair Value Measurements) and SFAS 159 (Option for fair value 
measurement), deciding to implement their provisions in the first quarter 
of its 2007 fiscal year. 
 
The Lehman case, as well as many others, raises the issue of FVA 
applicability as it is being extended from instruments traded in liquid and 
organized markets to credit-type instruments that are often securitized and 
which are not quite transparent about their underlying assets. The 
valuation of these credit-type instruments is made difficult by the lack of 
direct information, with heavy reliance on credit rating agencies’ opinions. 
Moreover, the market for these instruments is not as deep and liquid than 
traditional instruments such as bonds, equities or foreign currencies. It 
does appear that markets were not as efficient as they should have been in 
assessing the value of these structured investment vehicles or securitized 
pools of assets and may have relied too much on the judgment of parties 
such as credit rating agencies which themselves had partial information 
and were facing some potential conflicts of interests (since they charged 
fees to render opinions on specific securities).  
Accounting and the Market: Mirrors Facing Each Other 
The integration of market values on corporate balance sheets mandated by 
accounting standard setters contrasts with the trend by many analysts and 
sophisticated investors to use financial statement data to gauge whether a 
firm’s stock market value has moved away from its fundamental or 
“intrinsic value.”24 These divergent trends raise a fundamental question as 
to the grounding of financial statements. More specifically, MacIntosh, 
Shearer, Thornton and Welker argue that the market uses accounting 
earnings, along with other information, to value firms’ stock and other 
                                                   
24 See, for example, Lee, C., Myers, J., & Swaminathan, B. (1999). What is the intrinsic value of 
the DOW? Journal of Finance (forthcoming).Lee, M.C., J. Myers, and B. Swaminathan. 1999. 
What is the intrinsic value of the Dow? The Journal of Finance 54(5), 1693-1741.  
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securities.25 However, the prices of many of these securities underlie 
derivatives' prices, which then find their way into financial statements 
through FVA, thus completing a circular sequence! As MacIntosh et al. 
say: “Companies' earnings determine security prices, which determine derivative prices, 
which determine companies' earnings In short, neither the accounting sign nor the 
financial market sign appear to be grounded in any external reality. Instead, each model 
appeals to the other model for the only “reality check” available.”  
 
Lehman Brothers’ equity-based compensation illustrates the self-referential 
sequence that FVA introduces into financial reporting and stock market 
prices. In 2007, Lehman granted close to 39,000,000 deferred share units 
to its executives and employees. On the basis of the firm’s quoted stock 
price on the dates at which these grants were made, the overall value of 
the grant was around $2.7 billion. Since 2006, SFAS 123 has mandated the 
measurement and recognition of equity-based compensation at fair value, 
using an amortization method for grants that have a long-term vesting 
period, bringing Lehman Brothers’ expense for equity-based compensation 
in 2007 to $1.8 billion, close to 25% of earnings before income taxes and 
equity-based compensation expenses. Hence, on the one hand, the amount 
reflected as an expense by Lehman on its financial statements reflects the 
current quoted price of its stock at grant date. On the other hand, 
investors rely on Lehman’s reported earnings to assess its prospects and 
value its stocks. The chain of decisions exactly matches the above quote 
from MacIntosh et al. In addition to equity-based compensation, a 
significant proportion of Lehman Brothers’ assets were stocks and stock-
based derivatives (more than a third of its FVA assets). Since shares traded 
on a stock market are all affected to a varying degree by the same secular 
trends and fluctuations, one can argue that Lehman Brothers earnings and 
its stock price were mutual reflections of one another, possibly detached 
from underlying real operations. Such a conclusion can probably be 
extended to many financial institutions deeply involved in the current crisis 
or engulfed by it. 
Interface between Financial Reporting and Regulatory Capital 
One key criticism against FVA is that its use in the current crisis has led to 
a reduction in the value of financial institutions’ assets, which translated 
                                                   
25 MacIntosh, N.B., T. Shearer, D.B. Thornton, M. Welker. 2000. Accounting as simulacrum 
and hyperreality: Perspectives on Income and Capital. Accounting, Organizations and Society 25(1), 
13-60.  
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into a severe shrinking of their capital ratios, forcing them to deleverage 
and sell further assets at distressed prices, thus feeding the downward 
spiral. However, in that scenario, the issue is not necessarily the accounting 
itself but how financial regulators use accounting information. In other 
words, FVA-based financial reporting is only the messenger that a firm’s 
solvency is undermined by its financial strategies or lending practices, but 
it is up to regulators to figure out how to use such information.
26 
Messenger or Contributor? 
The above discussion suggests that assigning a messenger role to 
accounting potentially downplays its actual importance and relevance to 
the current crisis since the message is not neutral but conditioned by 
accounting standards. However, two issues arise from the use of FVA-
derived information in regulatory oversight. First, FVA information is 
highly volatile and unstable. For example, according to FVA, the wild 
fluctuations of the stock market over the past few weeks, with many daily 
closings showing gains or losses from the preceding day of between 5-
10%, imply similar fluctuations in any stock market-based assets. Hence, a 
firm may be solvent one day (assuming a large stock market gain), 
insolvent the next two days (assuming large stock market losses), and 
solvent again on the fourth day! While informative, is FVA-based financial 
reporting useful to regulators in planning and timing their interventions? The 
answer is that FVA information alone is probably necessary but is not 
sufficient. Other performance and risk metrics are needed to identify the 
targets of regulatory actions. A similar argument can be used to justify that 
FVA information is not sufficient for long term governance purposes as it is 
not stable enough and difficult to verify. In some sense, the reliance on FVA-
based information may have two opposite implications regarding the length 
and severity of the current crisis. On one hand, the discretion underlying FVA 
figures have allowed managers to delay the day of recognition when 
underlying subprime assets started to unravel. Moreover, the additional 
volatility that it introduces into financial statements may have amplified the 
impression of financial performance and stability in the bubble period. On the 
other hand, once the values of underlying assets started crashing, FVA 
                                                   
26 For instance, Irene Wiecek from the University of Toronto argues that “...the credit crisis is 
not the fault of accounting. It is the fault of overly lenient lending practices”. On top of that, 
she says there was a lack of oversight and regulation in this area” (G. Jeffrey, 2008).  
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Second, some argue that FVA values are actually a red herring and that the 
real issue is the quality of the accompanying disclosure.
28 For example, 
Susan Schmidt, a former governor of the Federal Reserve Board and bank 
CFO argues that the focus should be on disclosure so that everyone, 
regulators and investors alike, understand the drivers behind fair value 
estimates. Actually, FVA derived can be deceptive: up until close to the 
crisis, both Lehman Brothers and AIG appeared solvent and sufficiently 
capitalized, with significant portions of their balance sheet relying on FVA. 
However, what the FVA point estimate values did not tell was the extent 
of the downfall risk both firms were facing if events did not evolve 
according to expectations, Lehman because of its exposure to 
collateralized debt obligations and AIG because of its exposure to credit-
default swaps. Looking at both firms’ financial statements before the crisis, 
it would have been difficult to assess the potential magnitude of losses to 
be incurred because of these exposures. Hence, it can be ventured that 
FVA without adequate additional disclosure is neither fair nor a good 
reflection of value that is at risk.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of the appendix was to briefly present fair value accounting, 
its origins, application and implications for financial reporting as well as its 
potential role during the current financial crisis. While no definite 
                                                   
27 In that regard, it may be useful to note that other accounting standards beyond FVA may 
have played a role in the willingness of financial institutions to embark on a subprime asset 
growth strategy. One such standard relates to the recognition of gains upon the securitization 
of pools of assets (“sale accounting”). Essentially, under certain conditions, accounting 
practices allow for the accelerated recognition of gains upon the securitization of long-term 
assets, even if cash flows are spread out over many years. For instance, it has been reported 
that it was popular for banks that issued Collaterized Debt Obligations and similar instruments 
to retain the super-senior tranche and, at the same time, buy Credit Default Swaps from third 
parties. Since the cash portion held by the bank paid a higher spread that the cost to insure the 
bond, the bank was allowed to report upfront the amount of the difference to be realized over 
the life of the contract (Otherwise called a negative-basis trade). Earlier in 2008, AIG, the 
failed insurance giant, was forced by its auditor, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, to stop this practice 
as it was deemed that under current market conditions, it was impossible to reliably quantify 
the spread differential. For AIG, the shift in accounting practice translated into billions of 
dollars in write-offs (Credit Investment News, February 18, 2008, pp. 1 and 10.).  
28 Leone, M. 2008. Fair Value: It’s the Disclosure, Stupid. CFO.com. November, 20.  
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conclusion can be reached at this early stage, there is reason to believe that 
fair value accounting is more than just a messenger carrying bad news and, 
therefore, may have contributed to the acceleration of the crisis, especially 
in the financial sector. While the relevance of fair value accounting for 
investors cannot be questioned, its other qualities (or weaknesses) may 
have been overlooked by standard setters and regulators. 
 
Fair value accounting for financial instruments is part of a broader trend in 
accounting standard setting to move away from “accounting” toward 
estimating expected future cash flows and incorporating into financial 
statements, i.e., “forecounting”.
29 The trend undermines decades if not 
centuries of accounting practices and concepts such as conservatism and 
verifiability and requires a completely set of valuation skills and knowledge 
from accountants. The current crisis constitutes the first serious challenge 
to this trend, and to fair value accounting in particular, and is likely to 
generate abundant empirical research over the next few years which will 
allow us to better assess the pros and cons of fair value accounting. 
 
However, if not fair value accounting, what else? Standard-setters, and 
many accounting academics, argue that there is no alternative 
measurement or reporting model.
30   For instance, Barth (2007, p. 12), a 
member of the International Accounting Standards Board, argues that 
“Although opponents of more comprehensive use of fair value have some legitimate 
concerns, standard setters are unaware of a plausible alternative.” In contrast, Watts 
(2003, p. 219) argues that accounting standard setters should focus on 
accountants’ core competence, i.e., “...providing verifiable conservative 
information that market participants can use both as inputs in their own valuation and 
as calibration for their own and others’ unverifiable information”
31 As such, I would 
argue that the debate is at two levels: Barth is talking about the 
measurement of a final output while Watts refers to the validity of the 
various measurement inputs, the output being of some importance but 
mostly in terms of providing financial statement users and other 
stakeholders to adapt, modify or “test-drive” the resulting output. Beyond 
fair values, measurement assumptions and hypotheses are probably more 
                                                   
29 Magnan, Michel; Cormier, Denis. 2005. From Accounting to “Forecounting”. Canadian 
Accounting Perspectives 4(2): 243-257. 
30 Barth, Mary. 2007. Standard-Setting Measurement Issues and the Relevance of Research. 
Accounting and Business Research, Special Issue, 7-15. 
31 Watts, R.L. 2003. Open citation.  
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critical since they allow users to reconstruct the reality according to their 
own priors.  
 
However, underlying the debate, one must not lose sight that various 
financial and economic interests are at play – additional powers for 
standard setters, additional business for providers of accounting and 
valuation services, increased uncertainty about their bonuses for managers 
and executives, etc. Hence, viewpoints and arguments from interested 
parties must be reframed accordingly. 
 
The debate goes further than accounting and financial reporting and deals 
with the essence of what accountants are expected to contribute to society 
and, implicitly, what competences and skills they must possess to deliver in 
that regard. One may surmise that current accounting standards, such as 
those relating to fair value, probably overstretch accountants’ capabilities 
and prior learning and obscure other informational needs by investors and 
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Collateralized Debt Obligations: A Primer 





mong the dramatis personae of the current financial crisis, financial 
instruments known as collateralized debt obligations [CDOs] 
certainly have a leading role and, indeed for many, represent the major 
villain in the tragedy. The reality is that for many years these instruments 
have had a useful function in financial markets and it is important to 
understand the structure and role of these instruments before condemning 
them out of hand. Accordingly, in this section, we review the main 
features of cash CDOs and synthetic CDOs. Both instruments attempt to 
mitigate credit risk, albeit in different ways. The former are associated with 
the housing pricing bubble; the latter, for example, are at the center of the 
ABCP [asset-backed commercial paper] crisis that has affected several 
Montreal financial institutions.  
 
The primary objective in what follows is to make as clear as possible the 
structure of cash CDOs and synthetic CDOs in order to indicate what 
contributions these instruments make in managing credit risk while at the 
same time pointing to potential weaknesses and pitfalls in using the 
instruments. It should be stressed that, in contrast to the material 
presented in Appendix I, the discussion focuses entirely on the financial 
structure of these instruments and makes little attempt to give an empirical 
account of their actual market impact.  
 




Cash CDOs: Metamorphosis of Debt Quality?  
Consider a bank with a portfolio of mortgage loans that it wishes to 
remove from its balance sheet: it may wish to free up capital that otherwise 
would be needed to cover the risk exposure associated with these loans. It 
would issue a CDO with the following structure that effectively transfers 


















A third party plays an essential function in the CDO−the Special Purpose 
Vehicule [SPV]− which is a legal entity that has been created expressly for 
this CDO transaction. Originally established by the bank, it is run 
separately with separate management and no legal ties. In sum, the SPV 
buys the loans from the bank and issues the CDO; its assets are the risky 
debt it has purchased from the bank and its liabilities are the CDO notes it 
sells to investors. 
 
CDO notes are grouped into Tranches; in the simplified example 
presented above there are three Tranches. Here we follow closely the nice 
presentation by John Hull that can be found on his Web page, 
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull/DownloadablePublications/Credit
Crunch.pdf.  The cash flows from the mortgages are passed on to the 
holders of the CDO notes as follows: Tranche 3 is paid first according to 






















Tranche 1 receive the promised return [30%]. The higher return obtained 
by the less senior tranches reflects the risk held by the tranches.  The 
Equity Tranche bears the first 5% of losses on the underlying portfolio; 
the Mezzanine Tranche the next 20% losses. Only losses beyond 25% are 
borne by the Senior Tranche. 
 
The SPV is set up so that the Senior Tranche is rated AAA and, 
accordingly is highly sought after. The Equity Tranche is held by the 
originating bank or sold to a hedge fund. The Mezzanine Tranche proves a 
tougher sell, a challenge that led to the creation of what is called a Mezz 
CDO. Here the idea is to create a portfolio of mezzanine tranches which 
are in turn structured into a hierarchy of tranches. So we have a 










The Mezz CDO is structured so that the Senior Tranche is rated AAA 
[further credit enhancements may be involved]. As a consequence, the 
total of AAA instruments is now 90% of the original portfolio of 
mortgages [the original 75% plus 75% of 20%]. 
 
But it should be apparent that as presented above the losses to the Senior 
Tranche of the Mezz CDO will be 100% when there are more than 25% 
losses on the original portfolio of mortgages; after all, they are constructed 
from BBB loans that bear all losses up to 25%. Indeed, with losses to the 
mortgage portfolio of 20%, the Senior Tranche of the Mezz CDO still 
bears a significant portion of the losses, 66.7% in fact [the Mezzanine 
Tranche of the CDO bears 15% or ¾ of the loss; of this 75%, the Equity 
Tranche of the Mezz CDO bears 5% and the Mezzanine Tranche 20%, so 
the Senior Tranche bears 50% of the loss]. 
 
So the procedure of turning BBB obligations into AAA is a form of 










complicated affair involving important assumptions concerning default 
rates and correlations. In retrospect, it is perhaps surprising that there was 
such a significant market for these products. Hull in his paper cites an 
example where Merill Lynch agreed to sell $30.6 billion of Mezz CDOs 
that had been previously rated AAA to Lone Star Funds for as little as 22 
cents on the dollar [and financed 75% of the purchase price!]. 
Synthetic CDOs: Mark-to-Market Imbroglio 
A fundamental credit derivative instrument is the CDS [credit derivative 
swap]. The swap involves the exchange of two payments: the buyer of 
credit protection pays regular premiums to the seller of protection  in 
exchange for a payment made by the seller in the event of a credit event 
[eg, default] involving a reference asset [eg, a specific company]. The CDS 
is written to cover against the possibility that the reference asset defaults 
on its obligation. The comparison with insurance coverage is immediate. 
 
The combination of CDSs with the CDO structure described in the 
previous section characterizes what is called the synthetic CDO; synthetic 
because the credit risk although effectively hedged against is not truly 
removed from the originator’s balance sheet. The originating financial 
institution bundles various CDSs and enters into a contract with the SPV 
whereby premiums are paid the SPV in return for protection for all credit 
losses originating from the underlying reference entities. The SPV then 
uses the contract as collateral to issue the CDO notes structured as 
tranches with different rates of return according to the tranche. The 
tranches are examined by rating agencies receiving appropriate ratings 
given their characteristics. Super-senior tranches are so called because their 
expected rate of loss is significantly lower than the rate of loss associated 
with AAA rating. Owing to this relatively low risk, the Super-senior 
tranche offers the potential investor a low risk premium, a situation that 
led financial engineers to develop the notion of the LSS CDO [the 
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In a LSS the investor’s actual cash participation is less than the notional 
amount. Since coupon payments remain based on the notional amount, 
the effective return on the investment may be considerably higher [as 
much as ten times]. Otherwise put, the LSS tranche receives the benefit of 
the cash flows allocated to the full super senior tranche, thus allowing it to 
pay a considerably higher spread. Accordingly, it is not surprising that 
there was broad participation in the Super-senior market. Indeed, LSS 
CDOs have become the largest single class in the Canadian ABCP market.  
As at September 2007, the Canadian ABCP affected by the credit crisis 
totalized a notional of $26 billion of synthetic CDOs, $17.4 billion of the 
underlying these assets were LSSs. 
 
To make these points more concrete, suppose that in a standard super 
senior transaction, the investor has a cash participation of $1000. The 
super-senior tranche offers potential investor a low risk premium of 12 
bps [basis points]. By leveraging the 12bps premium of a super senior 
tranche by a factor of 10, LSS transaction provides outsized yield for an 
investor’s portfolio AAA portfolio. In this 10x leverage example, the 
investor would fund 10% (essentially on margin) of the super senior 
tranche notional. Effectively, the investor’s cash participation is $100 and 
the premium offered is 12bps based on a notional of $1000. In other 
words, the premium is 120bps for invested cash of $100. 
 
However, this implicit leverage comes at a price. In order to deal with the 
possibility that the SPV runs short of funds needed to pay the originator in 
case of defaults, the SPV can call on the LSS investors for cash injections, 
much as in a margin call in the traditional investment context. Accordingly, 
built into the CDO agreement is a specification of the conditions that 
trigger such calls for capital from the investors. The triggers are based on 
either (a) the market value of the Super-Senior Tranche or (b) collateral 
losses exceeding a threshold. Since the practical implications of these two 
approaches for LSS investors are considerable and important, a closer look 
is needed.  But it must first be noted that if the trigger, however defined, is 
breached, investors have a choice between partially deleveraging the 
transaction by posting additional margin/funding or walking away from 
the transaction at the current mark-to-market value. 
 
Typically, LSS with mark-to-market triggers are based on a daily pricing of 
the super senior tranche itself. However, the non-transparency of the  
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super senior tranche market is problematic and mark-to-market pricing 
may not be directly available. In such circumstances, models are used to 
price the LSS and the triggers are computed using what may be termed a 
mark-to-model procedure. Of course, the issue of which model to 
implement immediately arises. Using a model would be fine if there was a 
standard model. Even though there has been very significant convergence 
in pricing methodologies of Credit Default Swaps in recent years, some 
subjectivity still remains in the process of mark-to-market valuation. Each 
counterparty in the transaction has his own model and, moreover, may not 
even be willing to provide details concerning the application of these 
models as they are proprietary and are used for internal pricing and 
trading. In this context, it is quite challenging for the investor to monitor 
accurately the status of the investment and to assess the likelihood of 
breaching the trigger. 
 
By contrast, portfolio loss triggers are based on actual losses experienced 
by the underlying portfolio. As there is no spread component in this type 
of structure, the risk here is entirely credit-based and involves the investor 
taking a view on the timing of default that would be experienced over the 
life of the transaction. The loss trigger structure offers the investor a clear 
and observable trigger that can be monitored with no subjectivity. The 
main benefit of the loss trigger mechanism is that the LSS will deleverage 
or unwind only if there are actual defaults. Spread volatility, demand 
technicalities and liquidity issues do not have an impact on early 
unwinding or deleveraging. 
 
For the counterparty, however, the loss trigger is far from a perfect proxy. 
Namely, the biggest risk not captured by the loss trigger is the market 
value decline caused by the widening market spread. In other words, 
protection sellers in average are asking for higher Credit Default Swaps 
premiums to protect against the default of companies. Subsequently, those 
who sold a protection through LSSs before the credit crisis, are effectively 
long a basket of names, may have experienced a significant market value 
decline of their trade. Effectively, it would cost them higher premiums to 
close non maturing transactions.  On the other hand, in a situation where 
there is a spread blow-up but very few defaults, the protection buyer 
through LSSs gets no protection even though the market value of the LSS 
has changed significantly. 
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An alternative trigger mechanism is based on the level of weighted-average 
spread associated with the reference entities in the CDO portfolio and the 
actual number of defaults of the underlying names. It is usually specified 
via a spread-loss trigger matrix where one axis indicates the remaining time 
to maturity and other references the losses experienced in the portfolio. At 
any time, if the combination of portfolio average spread and time to 
maturity exceeds the levels in the matrix, the situation would trigger a 
margin call. 
 
In 2008, CIRANO conducted a quantitative study to assess the impact of 
changing margin triggers from mark-to-market triggers to spread-loss 
triggers that rely on independent standardized index spreads relative to 
treasury bonds. A typical LSS transaction in a conduit was analyzed and 
stress-tests were conducted. The study concluded that a transparent trigger 
should be based on a non-volatile measure; hence a pure loss trigger is the 
more desirable than the mark-to-market trigger. The study also concluded 
that a more effective trade-off among transparency, stability, and unwind 
likelihood is provided by the spread-loss trigger. CIRANO has emphasized 
that in case of replacement of mark-to-market triggers with spread-loss 
triggers, it is crucial that for each individual LSS in the Canadian ABCP (or 
the Master Asset that will replace the current ABCP), the spread triggers 
should be set at or slightly above the levels consistent with AAA rating. 
Setting the new triggers at AAA breakeven level will decrease the 
likelihood to have recourse to funding facilities due to margin calls. 
 
Recently [December 2008], the federal government in conjunction with 
three provinces and other parties, will provide a total of $4.45 billion in 
financial backstops to support a restructuring plan for a massive slice of 
this country's commercial paper market. In effect, the government will be 
responsible for responding to the margin calls.  
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CIRANO CDO Module 
Working with a partner, CIRANO has developed software that has the 
following functionality. For further information, contact Bryan Campbell 
at CIRANO. 
CDO Valuation and Risk measurement 
Monte Carlo simulation has been the most popular method for CDO 
valuation. It is flexible and relatively simple to implement. The major 
disadvantage is that Monte Carlo simulation can be resource intensive for 
large CDOs. In recent years non-Monte Carlo methods, also known as 
quasi-analytic or semi-analytic methods, have become more and more 
popular. They are more efficient than Monte Carlo simulation for certain 
types of synthetic CDOs, particularly, standardized tranches, where a one-
factor copula model is used to model the credit correlation of reference 
entities. The CIRANO module incorporates quasi-analytic method-based 
tools to value synthetic CDOs for standard and non-standard tranches. 
Default Correlation Calibration and sensitivity analysis 
Under a one-factor copula model with a constant factor loading, the 
default correlation of the credits in a reference pool is captured by a single 
asset correlation. The CIRANO module produces the base correlation 
surface using different mapping techniques on liquid standard synthetic 
CDOs. It provides also a variety of sensitivity measures (Delta, Gamma, 
Theta, Value –On-Default, etc.). The valuation framework allows for 
Internal Rating of the CDO transactions implied from real time Market 
quotes or from Mark-to-Model valuations. 
Hedging strategies in a distressed Market 
A key feature of the CIRANO platform is that it provides an advanced 
hedging toolbox. Effectively, it offers the user the possibility of defining, 
analyzing and backtesting customized or automatic hedging strategies. 
BCP LSSs monitoring on daily basis 
Based on real-time quotes of Credit Default Swaps and standard synthetic 
CDO tranches, the CIRANO module performs detailed end-of-day Mark-
to-Market valuation of the underlying ABCP LSS transactions. The 
module was used in an important model validation exercise conducted 
with asset providers in the Canadian ABCP conduit (Merill Lynch, 




This site provides an introductory illustration of the CIRANO module 
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Experimental Economics: A Revolution in Understanding Behaviour 
Jim Engle-Warnick, Sonia Laszlo, April 2008  
 
When and Why Does it Pay to be Green? 
Paul Lanoie, Stefan Ambec, Iain Scott, November 2007 
 
Des billets verts pour des entreprises vertes? 
Paul Lanoie, Stefan Ambec, Iain Scott, November 2007 
 
Le Québec et les droits de scolarité universitaire 
Robert Lacroix, Michel Trahan, February 2007 
 
Les nanotechnologies: bénéfices et risques potentiels 
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